



# An OpenLDAP backend for Samba 4


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# About Samba4



- Combines the file sharing service of Samba with a fully AD compatible Domain controller
- Can be a standalone Domain Controller
- Can join an existing Windows Active Directory domain as a member server, or an RODC
- Supports all FSMO roles
- Domain member machines running Windows work with Samba4 transparently
- Management can be done both with samba-tool and by installing Microsoft's RSAT (Remote Server Administration Tools) on a Windows machine.

# About Samba4


- Released in 2013 after more than 10 years in development
- New releases added every 6-9 months
- Successfully deployed by small to mid-sized companies
- Functionality is developed as separate LDB modules, similar in structure to OpenLDAP overlays
- Has its own internal DNS server, or can work with BIND9 using a BIND\_DLZ module.
- Has its own Kerberos KDC
- Used to have an OpenLDAP back-end, which got retired due to lack of resources and technical difficulties



## Samba with legacy OpenLDAP backend



## New Samba OpenLDAP Backend



# Implementation approach

- We started by replacing individual modules, but:
  - Samba modules are interconnected and often communicate with each other via internal controls
  - They rely on being executed in a specific order, and not all of them can be removed
  - Sometimes RPC traffic is initiated from inside a module, e.g samldb and replmetadata
- Switch to separate implementation of functionality within OpenLDAP, with manual testing via OpenLDAP directly, until LDAP behavior is as desired
- Determine how and if to remove or modify Samba modules later, after RPC tests

# Active Directory Schema

- Defined by objects of type attributeSchema and classSchema
- Schema updates are performed by added new objects of this type in the cn=Schema,cn=Configuration partition
- Schema objects cannot be deleted, only set to “defunct”
- Schema objects contain additional data, necessary for AD operation
- Some standard classes have additional non-standard attributes – e.g “top”



top

( 2.5.6.0 NAME 'top'

"DESC 'top of the  
superclass chain' "

"ABSTRACT MUST  
objectClass )"

```
"top", "( 2.5.6.0 NAME 'top' "
"DESC 'top of the superclass chain' "
"ABSTRACT MUST ( objectClass )"

MAY ( instanceType $ nTSecurityDescriptor $ objectCategory $ adminDescription
$ adminDisplayName $ allowedAttributes $ allowedAttributesEffective $
allowedChildClasses $ allowedChildClassesEffective $ bridgeheadServerListBL $
canonicalName $ cn $ description $ directReports $ displayName $
displayNamePrintable $ dSASignature $ dSCorePropagationData $
extensionName $ flags $ fromEntry $ frsComputerReferenceBL $
fRSMemberReferenceBL $ fSMORoleOwner $ isCriticalSystemObject $ isDeleted
$ isPrivilegeHolder $ lastKnownParent $ managedObjects $ masteredBy $ mS-
DS-ConsistencyChildCount $ mS-DS-ConsistencyGuid $ msCOM-PartitinSetLink $
msCOM-UserLink $ msDS-Approx-Immed-Subordinates $ msDs-masteredBy $
msDS-MembersForAzRoleBL $ msDS-NCReplCursors $ msDS-
NCReplInboundNeighbors $ msDS-NCReplOutboundNeighbors $ msDS-NcType $
msDS-NonMembersBL $ msDS-ObjectReferenceBL $ msDS-
OperationsForAzRoleBL $ "msDS-OperationsForAzTaskBL $ msDS-
ReplAttributeMetaData $ msDS-ReplValueMetaData $ msDS-TasksForAzRoleBL $
msDS-TasksForAzTaskBL $ name $ netbootSCPBL $ nonSecurityMemberBL $
objectVersion $ otherWellKnownObjects $ ownerBL $ parentGUID $
partialAttributeDeletionList $ partialAttributeSet $ possibleInferiors $
proxiedObjectName $ proxyAddresses $ queryPolicyBL $ replPropertyMetaData $
replUpToDateVector $ repsFrom $ repsTo $ revision $ sDRightsEffective $
serverReferenceBL $ showInAdvancedViewOnly $ siteObjectBL $ subRefs $
systemFlags $ url $ uSNDSALastObjRemoved $ USNIntersite $ uSNLastObjRem
$ uSNSource $ wbemPath $ wellKnownObjects $ wVWHomePage $
msSFU30PosixMemberOf $ msDFSR-ComputerReferenceBL $ msDFSR-
MemberReferenceBL $ msDS-EnabledFeatureBL $ msDS-LastKnownRDN $
msDS-HostServiceAccountBL $ msDS-OIDToGroupLinkBL $ msDS-
LocalEffectiveRecycleTime $ msDS-LocalEffectiveDeletionTime $ isRecycled $
msDS-PSOApplied $ msDS-PrincipalName $ msDS-RevealedListBL $ msDS-
AuthenticatedToAccountlist $ msDS-IsPartialReplicaFor $ msDS-IsDomainFor $
msDS-IsFullReplicaFor $ msDS-RevealedDSAs $ msDS-KrbTgtLinkBL $
whenCreated $ whenChanged $ uSNCreated $ uSNChanged $
subschemaSubEntry $ structuralObjectClass $ objectGUID $ distinguishedName $
modifyTimeStamp $ memberOf $ createTimeStamp $ msDS-NC-RO-Replica-
Locations-BL ) )"
```



# Samba provisioning with Legacy OpenLDAP

- Samba provisioning scripts creates slapd.conf
  - cn=Schema
  - cn=Configuration
  - Domain
  - 2 DNS application partitions
  - Refint and memberOf configuration to implement linked attributes
  - Indexing configuration
- Provisioning script creates a schema definition file for OpenLDAP
  - backend.schema
- Populates the created databases with the necessary initial data, including cn=Schema

# ad\_schema overlay

- Registers the attributeSchema and classSchema attributes in OpenLDAP schema
- On LDAP\_ADD, from the incoming entry:
  - Maps the AD style syntax to LDAP syntax
  - creates schema definition for the class or attribute that is registered in OpenLDAP schema
  - Adds the additional schema data to the expanded AttributeType and objectClass data
  - If the attribute is indexed, creates an index value for it in cn=config
  - If the attribute is linked, creates a memberOf configuration entry

## ad\_schema overlay – cont.

- LDAP\_SEARCH – creates the values for attributeInfo, classInfo, extendedAttributeInfo and extendedClassInfo for the subschema (cn=Aggregate, cn=Schema)
- On db\_open, loading of the schema data from the database, as it is no longer stored in a file (WIP)
- TODO – implement schema modification restrictions – such as modifying base schema objects, consistency checks, etc.



# Samba/AD Attribute definitions

```
attributetype (
  1.2.840.113556.1.4.656
  NAME 'userPrincipalName'
  EQUALITY caseIgnoreMatch
  SUBSTR caseIgnoreSubstringsMatch
  SYNTAX 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.15
  SINGLE-VALUE
)
```

```
extendedAttributeInfo:
( '1.2.840.113556.1.4.656' NAME
  'userPrincipalName' RANGE-UPPER '1024'
  PROPERTY-GUID
  'BB0E6328D541D111A9C10000F80367C1'
  PROPERTY-SET-GUID
  '54018DE4F8BCD111870200C04FB96050'
  INDEXED )
```

```
cn: User-Principal-Name
ldapDisplayName: userPrincipalName
attributeld: 1.2.840.113556.1.4.656
attributeSyntax: 2.5.5.12
omSyntax: 64
isSingleValued: TRUE
schemaIdGuid: 28630ebb-41d5-11d1-a9c1-
0000f80367c1
systemOnly: FALSE
searchFlags: fATTINDEX
rangeUpper: 1024
attributeSecurityGuid: e48d0154-bcf8-11d1-8702-
00c04fb96050
isMemberOfPartialAttributeSet: TRUE
systemFlags: FLAG_SCHEMA_BASE_OBJECT |
FLAG_ATTR_REQ_PARTIAL_SET_MEMBER
schemaFlagsEx: FLAG_ATTR_IS_CRITICAL
```



# Samba/AD Class definitions

```
objectclass (
2.5.6.14
NAME 'device'
SUP top
STRUCTURAL
MUST ( cn )
MAY ( bootFile $ bootParameter $ cn $
description $ ipHostNumber $
I $ macAddress $ manager $ msSFU30Aliases
$ msSFU30Name $ msSFU30NisDomain $
nisMapName $ o $ ou $ owner $ seeAlso $
serialNumber $ uid ))
```

```
extendedClassInfo: ( '2.5.6.14' NAME 'device'
CLASS-GUID
'8E7A96BFE60DD011A28500AA003049E2' )
```

```
cn: Device
ldapDisplayName: device
governorId: 2.5.6.14
objectClassCategory: 0
rdnAttId: cn
subClassOf: top
auxiliaryClass: ipHost, ieee802Device, bootableDevice
systemMustContain: cn
mayContain: msSFU30Name, msSFU30NisDomain, nisMapName,
msSFU30Aliases
systemMayContain: serialNumber, seeAlso, owner, ou, o, I
systemPossSuperiors: domainDNS, organizationalUnit,
organization, container
schemaIdGuid:bf967a8e-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2
defaultSecurityDescriptor: D:
(A;;RPWPCRCCDCLCLORCWOWDSDDTSW;;;;DA)
(A;;RPWPCRCCDCLCLORCWOWDSDDTSW;;;;SY)(A;;RPLCLORC;;;;AU)
defaultHidingValue: TRUE
systemOnly: FALSE
defaultObjectCategory:
CN=Device,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,<RootDomainDN>
systemFlags: FLAG_SCHEMA_BASE_OBJECT
```

# Syntax mapping

attributeSyntax	oMSyntax	oMObjectClass	LDAP OID
2.5.5.8 (Boolean)	1		1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.7
2.5.5.9 (Integer)	2, 10		1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.27
2.5.5.16 (Large Int)	65		1.2.840.113556.1.4.906
2.5.5.11 (UTC-Time)	23		1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.53
2.5.5.11(Generalized-Time)	24		1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.24
2.5.5.14(DN-String)	127	0x2A 0x86 0x48 0x86 0xF7 0x14 0x01 0x01 0x01 0x0C	1.2.840.113556.1.4.904
2.5.5.14(Access-Point)	127	0x2B 0x0C 0x02 0x87 0x73 0x1C 0x00 0x85 0x3E	1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.2

# Indexing and linked attributes

- Linked attributes are distinguished by the linkID attribute in their attributeSchema entry.
- LinkID%2 = 0 – forward link, forward link +1 back link
- searchFlags: fATTINDEX – the attribute is indexed

# Constructed and Operational attributes

- An attribute that is returned only when requested by name (systemFlags:FLAG\_ATTR\_IS\_OPERATIONAL)
- Constructed – FLAG\_ATTR\_IS\_CONSTRUCTED
- Special Attributes - not defined as operational or constructed but behave as such, or are created by the DS during object creation, yet not defined as constructed
- Secret attributes – a “hard-coded” list of attributes that is never exposed via LDAP

# objectguid

- Constructs and adds the objects':
  - GUID – a randomly generated unique identifier got the object
  - SID – Security Identifier of a security principal.
  - InstanceType
  - WhenCreated, whenChanged



# Demo

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# Active Directory Authorization Data

- Security Principal (`securityPrincipal`) – any entity that needs access to an object or resource. Can be a user, group, or a computer account. Uniquely identified by a Security Identifier (SID).
- Security context – a list of SIDs for all groups that the principal is member of, + the principle's own SID
- Security token – A data structure, representing the security context of a principle (`MS__DTYP`).
- Security Descriptor – Contains access control information about the object that it is associated with –  
`nTSecurityDescriptor` attribute of an object.

# sectoken

- **LDAP\_BIND**
  - Retrieve the user entry, and for each value of its memberOf attribute, retrieve the SID and add it to the list of SIDS
  - Do the above recursively
  - Set the Privileges flags
  - Attach the resulting structure to the ConnExtra of the connection
- **LDAP\_UNBIND** – destroy the security token structure



# Security Descriptor

dn: CN=Users  
O:DA  
G:DA  
D:AI(A;;RPWPCRCCDCLCLORCWOWDSDDTSW;;;SY)  
(A;;RPWPCRCCDCLCLORCWOWDSW;;;DA)  
(OA;;CCDC;bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;AO)  
(OA;;CCDC;bf967a9c-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;AO)  
(A;;RPLCLORC;;;AU)  
(OA;CI OID;RP;b7c69e6d-2cc7-11d2-854e-00a0c983f608;bf967a86-0de6-  
11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;ED)  
(OA;CI ID;RPWPCR;91e647de-d96f-4b70-9557-d63ff4f3ccd8;;PS)  
(A;CI ID;RPWPCRCCDCLCLORCWOWDSDDTSW;;;EA)  
(A;CI ID;RPWPCRCCCLCLORCWOWDSDSW;;;BA)

# Calculating SD for a new object

- Input
  - SD of the parent container
  - SD provided by the client
  - Default SD (from defaultSecurityDescriptor attribute)
  - Session's security Token
- Output
  - Owner, Group, Explicit ACEs, Inherited ACEs

# secdescriptor

- **LDAP\_ADD**
  - Collects the necessary data – parent SD, default security descriptor.
  - Calculates the new descriptor using some Samba library functions and adds it to the new entry.
- **LDAP MODIFY**
  - Recalculates the SD's of the modified object and all of its children.
- **LDAP\_MODRDN**
  - Similar to LDAP MODIFY, still work in progress.
- **LDAP SEARCH**
  - Handles the sDFlags control



# Required access for LDAP operations

- Search
  - LIST\_CHILDREN on the parent, READ\_PROPERTY
- Add
  - CREATE\_CHILD
- Modify
  - WRITE\_PROPERTY
- Delete
  - DELETE\_CHILD on the parent or DELETE on the object
- Rename
  - DELETE\_CHILD on the parent, CREATE\_CHILD on the new parent, WRITE\_PROPERTY on the rdn attribute

# Some changes to Samba

- Removed most attribute and object-class mappings, as the required attributes and object classes are supported by OpenLDAP
- Slapd.conf – no longer uses backend.schema, index, refint or memberOf configurations

# Next Challenges

- Full implementation of the SAMDB
- Kerberos authentication of OpenLDAP users using the Samba KDC
- “Catching up” with Samba – changes to the way LDB uses event contexts, and changes to the Samba process model



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